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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Ohio, like many highest state courts, is in a
crisis resulting from an unseemly flood of money into statewide judicial
election campaigns.' We address that crisis in this article.
Most judges around the world are not elected. And, of course, our
federal judges are not. We hope it will not try the patience of readers if we
first explain why those who sit on the state courts in Ohio are elected. That
hope is nourished by the fact that the best published justification for
electing judges was written in Chillicothe, Ohio, in 1848 in a work we will
briefly review.
The reasons why Ohioans chose in the nineteenth century to elect their
judges are still present and perhaps greater even than they were in 1848,
but the impediments to such elections are now much greater. The question
we propose to answer is whether there are steps that might be taken that
would ease the present crisis without abandoning the aims of the state
constitution. We believe there are.
II. WHY DOES OHIO ELECT ITS JUSTICES?
The provisions of the Ohio constitution bearing on the Supreme Court
of the state were crafted by Ohioans known to their political adversaries as
Bamburners. 2 Barnburners derived their politics from two texts they
deemed sacred: Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and
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I
These problems are, indeed, the object of national concern. They have recently
been examined by the Century Fund. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: PouTIcs AND AMERICA'S
COURTS: THE REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCES OF CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS

(2000)

[hereinafter UNCERTAIN JUSTICE]. The American Bar Association has recently staged
several conferences pertaining to the general subject. The papers for the conference held in
Philadelphia in December 1998 are published in colloquy, Judicial Independence and
Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Winter 1999), and at its 2001 meeting made
specific recommendations bearing on the problem that are reflected in the proposal
advanced in the second part of this article.
2
The name Barnbumers was meant to suggest that that they were the sort of folks
who would burn their barns to drive the rats out.
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Andrew Jackson's Bank Veto Message.3 Barnburners preferred to identify
themselves as members of an "Equal Rights Party;" this "party" was not a
political organization, but merely a shared intention to resist the claims of
privilege. Its motto was "free labor, free speech, free trade, and free
schools," meaning they opposed slavery, practiced divergent forms of
Protestantism, resisted the claims of corporate industry to a protective
4
tariff, and sought education for their children in community schools.
Their ideal was a classless society.
Barnburner ideas about law dominated American legal institutions in
the nineteenth century.
They led the assault, on apprenticeship
requirements for admission to the bar, which they saw as undemocratic
sanctuaries of privilege. 5 They were advocates for the simplification of
civil procedure to reduce the amount of arcane knowledge needed to
present a case in court. 6 They were the champions of the contingent fee 7
and the American Rule forbidding routine fee-shifting against losing
parties 8 to protect the access of impecunious plaintiffs to judicial forums.
They disfavored the mysteries of judge-made law and promoted

3
"It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of
government to their selfish purposes.... [W]hen the laws undertake to add to [their] natural
and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities and exclusive privileges,
to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humbler members of society--the
farmers, mechanics, and laborers-who have neither the time nor the means of securing like
favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their government. There
are not necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine
itself to equal protection, and as heaven does its rain, shower its favours alike on the high
and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing." 2 COMPILATION OF
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 590 (J.D. Richardson comp. 1908).
4
For a more complete discussion of the ideology of the Equal Rights Party, see
generally MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSON PERSUASION, POLITICS AND BELIEF (1957).
5
For brief accounts of their efforts in this field, see MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD,
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 32-58 (1976); SAMUEL HABER,
THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900 91-116

(1991).
6

See generally

CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE

PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND (1897); ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952); Steven Subrin, David Dudley

Field and the Field Code: An Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW &
HIST. REV. 311 (1988).
7
F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF
PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 36-38 (1964); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS

s

56 (1986).

John Leubsdorf, Toward A History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee

Recovery, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 9 (Winter 1984).
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codification to make the law's texts equally accessible to all. 9 They also
favored the popular election of judges to limited terms as a means of
assuring both their independence from the selfish manipulators of
legislative assemblies and their accountability for their fidelity to the legal
texts, common interests, and moral values of the communities they
served.10 They viewed all of these programs for law reform as means of
facilitating the protection of the equal rights of citizens otherwise exposed
to the unwarranted claims of privilege.
The leading Barnbumer in matters of law reform was David Dudley
Field of New York.11 Others of a more academic bent established law
schools at New York University 12 and the University of Michigan.1 3 One,
Thomas Cooley of Michigan,' 4 was the most respected lawyer in America
through most of the second half of the nineteenth century and the author of
an elegant book comparing the constitutional laws of the states. 15 But the
principal Bamburner legal theorist was Frederick Grimkd of Chillicothe.
GrimkW was born in South Carolina in 1791, one of fourteen children
sired by a Charleston lawyer educated at Eton and Cambridge University.16
His father served as a lieutenant colonel in the revolutionary army and
represented South Carolina in the Continental Congress. The young
GrimkM was the senior orator of his Yale class of 1810 and practiced law in
Charleston with his father until 1819. When his father died, he moved to
the pioneer village of Chillicothe, where he was quickly recognized as a
9

See generally CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 185-200 (1981). For a recent review of a very
successful codification movement in nineteenth century Montana. and a reconsideration of
this initiative, see Andrew P. Morris et al., Debating the Field Code 105 Years Later, 61
MONT. L. REV. 371 (2000).
10

EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 92-93 (1944); Caleb

Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in
Antebellum America, 37 AM. J.LEGAL HIsT. 190 (1993).
11 For a comprehensive biography of Field, see DUAN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW (1986).
12
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 1832-1932 6 (Theodore F. Jones, ed. 1933); LESLIE JAY
TOMPKINS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, PAST AND PRESENT I 1-14 (1984).
13
ELIZABETH G. BROWN, LEGAL EDUCATION AT MICHIGAN, 1859-1959 3-6 (1959);

Thomas M. Cooley, The Founding of the Law Department of the University of Michigan, in
SENIOR LAW CLASS ANNUAL 93 (1894).
14
For a discussion of Cooley's illustrious career, see PAUL D. CARRINGTON,
STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBUC PROFESSION 47-117 (1999).
I5
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH

REST

UPON

THE

LEGISLATIVE

POWER

OF THE

STATES

OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION (1878).

16

A more detailed biography of Grimke is presented in Arthur A. Ekirch Jr.,

Frederick Grimke: Advocate of Free Institutions, I J. HIST. IDEAS 75 (1950).
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man of exceptional ability and modesty. Within eighteen months of his
arrival in Ohio, he was appointed to the Court of Common Pleas. In 1837,
he was elevated to the Supreme Court of Ohio, a position from which he
retired in 1842 in order to devote himself to philosophy.
Grimk remained a bachelor throughout his life. For much of his forty
years in Ohio, he lived and worked in a hotel room in Chillicothe. His
personal life is known almost entirely from his correspondence with his
sister, Sarah. 17 She and another sister, Angelina, both joined a Quaker
Meeting and became ardent and renowned emancipationists and feminists.
Grimk was also the uncle of Francis' 8 and Archibald Grimkd, 19 the
notable black sons of his brother, both of whom devoted long and vigorous
careers to the cause of equal rights for blacks.
Grimk6 wrote two books, one on literature and one on law. The latter
was entitled Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free
Institutions. It was first published in Cincinnati in 1848.20 He revised it
once. Neither edition was widely read, as he must have expected, because
his stated purpose was to "correct ... the vitiated taste for reading which
prevails in our country." 21 A reviewer for the distinguished Boston
monthly, the North American Review, praised Free Institutions cautiously,
"'unwillingly, as if none but a
giving "'great praise,"' as Grimk6 noted,
22
Bostonian could write a great work."'
On many matters it treats, Grimk6's work may be the most perceptive
law book written in the nineteenth century. It was republished by the
Harvard University Press in 1968.23 It is, however, a book that will not
17
This correspondence is located at the Clements Library of the University of
Michigan.
Is
Francis Grimk6 was a graduate of Princeton and Presbyterian minister. THE
WORKS OF FRANCIS J. GRIMKE (Carter G. Woodson ed., 1942).

19
After graduating from Harvard Law School, Archibald Grimk was appointed by
President Grover Cleveland in 1894 as consul to Santo Domingo. Archibald supported
W.E.B. Dubois, Moorfield Story, and others in the founding of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People. Angelina W. Grimke, A Biographical Sketch of
Archibald H. Grimke, OPPORTUNITY: J. NEGRO LIFE, Feb. 1925, at 44.
20

See FREDERICK GRIMKE, CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF

FREE INSTITUTIONS .(H.W. Derby & Co. 1848).

Grimkt revised the work and Derby

published a second edition in 1852. It also appears as I THE WORKS OF FREDERICK GRIMKE
(Columbus Printing Co. 1871).
21
Frederick Grimke, Preface to the Second Edition of FREDERICK GRDMKE, THE
NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 45, 45 (John William Ward ed.,

Harvard

Univ. Press 1968) (1848) [hereinafter GRIMKE, FREE INSTITUTIONS].
22
John William Ward, Introduction to GRIMKE, FREE INSTITUTIONS, supra note 21,
at 2 n.5 (quoting Grimkd).
23

See GRIMKE. FREE INSTITUTIONS, supra note 21.

It was republished under an

abbreviated title by the Harvard University Press with editorial comment by John William
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appeal to contemporary readers. First, Grimk6, despite having nephews of
African descent, was a racist. He deplored slavery as inconsistent with the
ideals of a free society and offered no defense for it, but he expressed a
lack of confidence in the ability of black citizens to participate in
democratic government on even terms, 24 even though he regarded
acceptance of social equality as an indispensable condition of "free
institutions." 25 Neither slave owner nor abolitionist could find comfort in
his words on that subject.
Also, although Grimk6 ridiculed the nullification doctrine advanced by
his fellow South Carolinians, 26 he expressed the belief, rejected by

Ward. Id. All subsequent citations to CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE AND TENDENCY
OF FREE INSITrUTIONS will be to the Harvard University Press's 1968 edition, titled THE
NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS.

2
rimkd's lack of confidence in the capacity of slaves of African descent to
participate in free society is repeated throughout THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE
INSTITUTIONS. See, e.g., id. at 418 (labeling African slaves "an inferior and unenlightened
order of men"). The tension between his negative assessment of the capacity of African
slaves as freed persons and his discomfort with the existence of slavery within a free society
also pervades the book. See, e.g., id. at 579.
But if one only knew how to deal with so difficult and delicate a subject, if one only had
the ability requisite to remove the institute without leaving worse consequences behind,
there can be no doubt that it would be better that all the occupations of society should be
filled by a free population exclusively.
Id.
25
Grimkd viewed equality in a manner similar to what was later popularly dubbed
the "American Dream." With government promising equality before the law, those with
ability, motivation, and ingenuity could ascend the socio-economic ladder. As proof,
Grimke noted that "[individuals] without education, with ordinary faculties, and who
commenced life with little or nothing, are continually emerging from obscurity and
displacing those who have acquired fortunes by inheritance." Id. at 115. This effect of
social equality, consistent with Social Darwinism, explains why legal equality actually
"brings out in bolder relief all the natural inequalities of men." Id. at 116. "The different
degrees of sagacity, energy, and opportunity which fall to the lot of individuals will forever
create a wide difference in their respective fortunes." Id. at 575. The importance of social
equality to free institutions lies in the political protections it provides against a tyranny of
the wealthy: "as a large proportion of the envious are constantly rising into the ranks of the
envied; a powerful check is imposed upon the revolutionary tendencies of the former." Id.
at 116. For a more complete discussion of Grimke's views on equality, slavery, and "free
institutions," see id. at 105-18, 572-608.
26
See id. at 494:
It is remarkable that those who advocate [the nullification doctrine]
have taken for granted the existence of a power which is nowhere
recognized in the constitution and at the same time deny the
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Marshall, Webster, Jackson, Story, and Lincoln, that a state could secede
a
from the union. 27 Indeed, he predicted that before America 2had
8
population of 150 million, it would divide into several confederacies.29
He
It has been said that Grimke was "a sociologist of politics."
might better be denoted as a political moralist. The theme of his work was
advocacy of a moral duty of lawyers and judges responsible for "free (i.e.,
self-governing) institutions" to practice self-control and submission to
legal texts understood in light of the values of the community they purport
to serve. He presented the Constitution of the United States as a
framework for the practice of that public virtue, not, as most today would,
as a framework for judicial supremacy. "Free," in his vocabulary, referred
to the freedom of citizens to govern themselves; only incidentally to that
freedom was he concerned with the individual rights that so preoccupy
American politics today.
Grimk6 imposed a lesser but equally important duty on non-lawyer
citizens sharing responsibility for "free institutions." The citizen's duty is
not only to engage actively in politics, but also to give moral reinforcement
to the duty of officers to control themselves and to engage in mutual selfcontrol by imposing moral as well as legal restraints on one another's
selfish or idiosyncratic political impulses. Apathetic citizens will, Grimke
foretold, become the objects of government as a "self-existing
institution," 30 and those who, while participating in public affairs,
aggressively pursue their own idiosyncratic preferences or self-interest will
beget destabilizing mistrust.
The chief virtue of democracy, in Grimk 's view, was its nurturing of
a wholesome and productive sense of individual autonomy and self-esteem
on the part of citizens, moderated by a shared sense of mutual
responsibility. "Kingly authority" he dismissed as "an illusion of the
imagination" 3 1 that stunts the moral development of a people. He did not
suppose that political conflict among citizens would be painless or that
wise decisions would always be made, but did suppose that the process of
democratic resolution of conflict rendered men more prudent and more
considerate of their fellow citizens than they would otherwise be. 32 He
jurisdiction of the supreme court, which is contained in language as
unequivocal as could be desired ....

For a more expansive criticism of the nullification doctrine by Grimke, see id. at 477-502.
27

Id. at 477-517.

29

Id. at 362.

29

John William Ward, Introduction to GRIMKF, FREE INSTITUTIONS, supra note 21,

at 12.
GrimkM used this term repeatedly to denote political institutions lacking
30
accountability to the people they govern.
31
Id. at 692.
This theme is also repeated throughout Grimki's works. See, e.g., id. at 582.
32
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was also mindful that one is less likely to resent and more likely to accept a
political decision that one had a hand in making or at least an opportunity
to oppose directly by the power of the ballot.
It is from these premises regarding the merits of self-government that
Grimk6 wrote his most informed and illuminating chapter on the judicial
power.33 It begins by dismissing the reassurance of Montesquieu (and
implicitly of Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 78)34 that the judiciary is
the weakest of the three departments of government. 35 He conceded that
the judiciary deals less directly and less frequently with political issues, but
those it handles have political consequences, and "[ilf then the judges are
appointed for life, they may have the ability to act upon society, both
36
inwardly and outwardly, to a greater degree than the other departments.
Indeed, given the frequency with which other officers rotate in and out of
office, he prophesized that "[if the executive officers of the courts were
only appointed by the courts, we might say that the judiciary has usurped
37
nearly all the executive power of the state."
"There may," Grimk6 wrote, "be the most solid reasons why, in a
monarchical government, the judges should be independent, in the English
sense of the term; and yet these reasons may be inapplicable in a republic..
. .3 Of course, he conceded, judges should be freed from the control of
other individuals, especially those who litigate, but they should not be
independent of "the community which they are appointed to serve." 39 He
did not quote Lord Acton's famous apothegm about the corrupting effect
of power, especially absolute power, but he assures
us that such an effect is
4°
not unknown among members of the judiciary.
33

See id. at 438-75.

34

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The

reassurance was perpetuated by ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).

See GRIMKE, FREE INSTITUTIONS, supra note 21, at 438 ("[Il]n
a democratic
republic, where the legislative and executive authority is strictly bounded on all sides, the
35

judicial may become a very imposing department.").
36
37/

id. at 438-49.
Id. at 444.

38

ld. at 445.

39

Id.

40
For Grimkd, public opinion serves to ensure self-control on the part of judges and
lawyers. Grimk6 saw the disregard of public opinion by judges as an abuse of the power
given them within the republic. Life tenure increases the likelihood that judges will grow

independent of the community they serve:
[Wihen the judge is sure, provided he commits no technical violation of
duty, that he will retain his station for life, he is very apt to regard

himself as entirely absolved from [the influence of public opinion].
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Grimkd emphasized that judicial power to expound the law is
essentially a legislative function. He was in effect a nineteenth century
Legal Realist. In a statement that both hints of later Realist thought and
offers possible insight into voter apathy in more recent judicial elections,
Grimk6 noted that "if it is not wise to confer a permanent tenure of office
upon the executive and legislative, it should not be conferred upon the
judiciary; and the more so, because the legislative functions which the last
perform is a fact entirely hidden from the great majority of the
community." 4 1
The legislative function of the judiciary "is inevitable," Grimk6 said,
• . .and arises from the inherent imperfection which
attends all human institutions. It is not in the power of
any . . . legislative assembly, however fertile in
resources their understandings may be, to make a
all,
system of ready-made rules which shall embrace 42
or any thing like all, the cases which actually occur.
"Perhaps," he speculated, "it is no more than happens to every
department of knowledge; for every conquest which science makes...
only presents a new vantage ground whence the mind can see further and
take in a wider scope than it did before. '4 3 He denied that decisions can be
mere deductions from general principles, even those crafted by a
legislature of geniuses. The term of judicial office should therefore be
"long enough to enable the public to make a fair trial of the ability and
moral qualities of the incumbent; and not so long as to prevent a removal
in a reasonable time if he is deficient in either." 4 4
Grimk6 emphasized that it is also inevitable that persons will be
elevated to the bench "who are deficient in both the moral and intellectual
qualities" required. For Grimkd, some good lawyers are bad judges, and
lawyers "less than the most eminent" occasionally become very
distinguished judges. He opposed any principle giving an incompetent or
for thirty or forty years
badly-disposed judge a place on a high court
45
merely because he was not a flagrant criminal.
And although he may not outrage the law in a single instance, he may
give evidence of the narrowest views and the most rooted bigotry,
which, although unperceived by himself, will give a tinge to the whole
administration of justice.
Id. at 448.
41
42

43
"

45

Id. at 452.

Id. at 449.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 457-58.
Id. at 452.
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Grimk6's contemporary, John Stuart Mill, offered an additional
expression implicit in Grimkd's observations about the need to impose
restraints on judges:
The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or fellowcitizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a
rule of conduct for others, is so energetically supported by
some of the best and some of the worst feelings incident to
human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by
anything but want of power ....
46
Grimk6 saw a judiciary without accountability as a likely cause of
political instability because of its tendency to identify with a ruling or
propertied class. He reckoned that a substantial measure of social equality
is a precondition to the republican form of government providing political
stability. A republic marked by the existence of a permanent ruling class is
unlikely, he insisted, to remain politically stable because the greed of the
privileged few will dissolve the loyalties of the subordinate many. He thus
perceived that an arrogant judiciary and a pretentious legal profession are a
perpetual threat to the social and political equality on which "free
institutions" depend.
Grimkd's opposition to life tenure was not specifically directed at the
federal judiciary. Many states, even before the federal constitution was
drafted, had with little reflection adopted the provision governing the
tenure of the English judiciary who since 1700 had served "for good
behavior" 47 that was also later written into Article III of the federal
Constitution. 48 He was chiefly concerned with the state courts for they
49
were in his time much more important institutions than the federal courts.
There was no discussion of the term "for good behavior" at
Philadelphia in 1787. Indeed, there is little evidence that those who wrote
eighteenth century constitutions understood that, by sending the highest
courts on political errands, they had made those institutions fundamentally
different from the substantially depoliticized English law courts they had
known. The Founders should perhaps have foreseen that the high courts
they devised would not be staffed by apolitical technocrats of the law such
as judges sitting in England at the time, but would often be institutions
46
BENTHAM

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY ON
140 (Mary Warnock ed., 1962). Justice Rehnquist also quoted this passage in his

dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,467 (1971) (14ehnquist, J., dissenting).
47
Act of Settlement Act, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 2, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.).
48
U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1.
49
There was in 1848 no federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts, very little
litigation in which the United States was a party, and no federal bill of rights applicable to
limit the power of state legislatures where most legislation was made. Hence, the bulk of
federal litigation were diversity cases.
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working in political thickets. 50 It seems, however, that they did not see
this aspect of their work, or else they surely would not have conferred life
tenure on members of high courts. 5 1
One aspect of the problem of life tenure that none could then foresee
was the extension of life expectancies occurring in the twentieth century,
making it likely that in another generation we will have many Justices
sitting on the Supreme Court of the United States for a half century. In
today's world, life tenure would be unthinkable to many and is retained as
a feature of the Supreme Court of the United States only because the
federal Constitution is so difficult to amend.
Being thus very clear that term limits for judges were indispensable,
Grimk6 faced up to the question of deciding on what conditions a judge's
term should be extended. He celebrated the New York Constitution of
1846 drafted by his fellow Barnbumer David Dudley Field as "one of the
52
greatest experiments which has ever been made upon human nature."
One of the most promising "experiments" in his opinion was the popular
election of judges, an experiment that had been previously initiated in other
states.
Grimkd affirmed that elected judges would have greater independence
from the unworthy influence of governors and legislators and their
managers and might thus hope to secure greater trust by the people. He
acknowledged the difficulty faced by voters in discerning the professional
competence of a judicial candidate, but endorsed as imperative the need to
subordinate the judicial power to the will of self-governing citizens. He
50
This was entirely evident by 1800 when President Adams made his midnight
appointments, to the frustration of the incoming Secretary of State, James Madison. A
purpose of those appointments was stated by Governeur Morris: to withstand "'a heavy gale
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 15 (1971) (quoting Governeur Morris). Martin Van Buren later

of adverse wind."'

referred to the device as the creation of an "an ark of safety" from which Federalists could

continue to control the federal government.

MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN

AND COURSE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 278
51
Perhaps they did consider the problem when they

(1867).
wrote Article II. It is quite
the President set forth
electing
system
for
possible that the elaborate and sometimes screwy
Court of the United
the
Supreme
of
keeping
purpose
in that Article was designed for the
the
sort of thing that
States from having any role in presidential politics and preventing
(2000)
(holding, in a 5U.S.
98,
103
Gore,
531
See
Bush
v.
election.
happened in the 2000
manual
recounts in the
authorizing
decision
Court's
Supreme
that
the
Florida
4 decision,
aftermath of the 2000 presidential election violated the Equal Protection Clause, effectively
ending the controversy and establishing George W. Bush as the victor). At least in
hindsight, it seems obvious that the last persons in government at any level who should be
assigned a role in counting votes are the Justices whose own personal political power
depends on the identity of other Justices to be appointed by an incoming President.
52
GRIMKE, FREE INSTITUTIONS, supra note 21, at 461.

20021

ACCOUNTABILITY OF SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

465

reacted to the rejoinder that the life-tenured judicial power is needed to
balance the power of a legislative body too responsive to momentary
popular sentiment, observing that "the system of interior checks can never
be relied upon where there exists no power external to the government to
act upon all the departments and to maintain each in its proper place." 5 3
Perhaps the people would not always pick the ablest judges possible, but it
was more important that the judges understand that their role in the
political system is limited by a measure of accountability to the people.
Term limits and elections together serve those needs. One may hope for
more than that understanding, but, given the demerits of alternative
methods of selecting judges, it is best to assure that primary purpose.
Grimk6's writing on the judicial power foretold the drafting of the
Ohio constitution of 1851,54 which, like the Michigan constitution of
1850, 55 tracked the New York constitution of 1846.56 All three were
written by Barnburners and were remarkably similar; all provided for the
election of judges, most of them to six year terms. His position on the need
for judicial elections was endorsed by the revered Thomas Cooley even
after he had been defeated for re-election in a partisan landslide. 57 Cooley
brought the late nineteenth century English observer, Lord Bryce,
reluctantly to the conclusion that such elections were justified. 58
The thoughts expressed in Grimk6's Free Institutions also bear
similarities to ideas contemporaneously expressed by some Whigs, the
political adversaries of Jacksonian Democrats. There were in Grimke's
time thoughtful Whigs conducting in Cincinnati 59 and Lexington,

53

Id. at 635.

54

The Ohio Constitution of 1851 remains in effect, as amended. See generally

OHIO CONST.

55

The Michigan Constitution of 1850 was repealed and replaced with a new

Constitution in 1908. SUSAN P. FiNo, THE MICHIGAN STATE CONSTrIUTION: A REFERENCE

GUIDE 8-14 (1996).
56
The New York Constitution of 1846 was repealed and replaced with a new
Constitution in 1867. PETER J.GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF

NEW YORK 117-21 (1996).

57
A brief account of Cooley's defeat is set forth in CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at
67. His twenty-year tenure on the Supreme Court of Michigan is also briefly discussed.
See id. at 55-67. For a more comprehensive account of Cooley's career on the bench, see
generally George Edwards, Why Justice Cooley Left the Bench: A Missing Page of History,

33 WAYNE L. REV. 1563 (1987).
58
1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 507-08 (3d ed. 1905).
59
On the politics of Timothy Walker, the founder of the Cincinnati Law School, see
generally Paul D. Carrington, Teaching Law in the Antebellum Northwest, 23 U. TOL. L.
REV. 3 (1992).
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Kentucky, 6° two of the nation's major law schools. Most respected by
thoughtful lawyers of that era was the work of Francis Lieber, a Prussian
immigrant teaching at the College of South Carolina, who admired the
politics of the Federalist Alexander Hamilton. 6t Lieber published a decade
before Grimke works on Political Ethics6 2 and Legal Hermeneutics6 3 that
64
were widely read and were revived in the 1880s and again in the 1990s.
The difference between Grimke's beliefs and those of contemporary Whigs
such as Lieber was one of degree in the extent to which an elite
professional class of lawyers could or should seek to impose its politics on
self-governing citizens. Even Lieber was for a time persuaded that the
election of judges was a sound idea. 65 Whig lawyers and judges were
prone to question the capacity not only of the electorate, but also of those
they elect as representatives to make wise and humane political decisions.
They saw the legal profession as political saviors, a role for which they
were cast by Hamilton in The FederalistPapers and by other adherents to
the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Barnburners were somewhat more
optimistic about the capacities of the electorate, but chiefly more
pessimistic about the capacities of an elite professional class, represented
by the judiciary, to exercise sound judgment regarding the common
interest or to gain the acceptance and moral support of citizens whose
political choices they tended to disdain or frustrate.66

60
On the politics of the Transylvania faculty, see Paul D. Carrington, Teaching Law
and Virtue at Transylvania Univ.: The George Wythe Tradition in the Antebellum Years, 41
MERCER L. REV. 673 (1990).
61
Lieber published eighteen books and is the subject of six biographies. He was
also the founding intellect of the Columbia Law School and the "patron saint" of American
international law. For a brief account of Lieber's career, see generally Paul D. Carrington,
The Aims of Early American Law Teaching: The Patriotismof Francis Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 339 (1992).
62
FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS (1838).
63
FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (2d ed. 1939), which first
appeared serially in AMERICAN JURIST in 1837 and 1838.

64

LEGAL HERMENEbTICS was most recently republished in 1995 in volume 16 of the

Cardozo Law Review. See Francis Lieber, Legal and Policial Hermeneutics, or Principles
of Interpretationand Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedentsand
Authorities, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883, 1883-2105 (1995).

65

He was for a time supportive of the election of judges, but changed his mind. See
FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 221-28 (2d ed. 1859). His
defense of the institution of the jury was ardent.
66
Grimkd's position with respect to the role of the judiciary and legal profession
within a republican form of government represented not only the Barnburners of his own
era, but was also shared by many who came later, including Thomas Cooley and some

leaders of the Progressive movement of the early twentieth century such as Louis Brandeis,
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Most persons who have thought responsibly about the problem of
imposing political power on judges sitting on courts of last resort have
agreed with Grimk6 that life tenure for those responsible for the
enforcement of a constitution that is difficult to amend is a genuinely bad
idea. Since he wrote in 1848, there have been hundreds of constitutions
written for American states and for other nations that provide for judicial
oversight of other branches of government. We have found only one that
copies the provision of the federal Constitution allowing Justices to sit
until they are impeached and removed by the legislature. That is the
constitution of Western Samoa, 6 7 and that instrument is much easier to
amend than is the Constitution of the United States. 68 All others, whether
American or foreign, impose limits on the terms of office and provide a
practicable system of constitutional amendment to correct the excesses of
the judiciary in their enforcement. 69 On the other hand, very few
constitutions written for other countries provide for the election of judges
by vote of the people.
Yet some states have carried the idea of popular accountability much
further than Ohio. Most controversial was the constitutional provision for
recall of judges. 70 California has such a provision in its constitution,
alongside its generous provisions for initiative and referendum. When
Arizona sought statehood with a constitution containing such a provision,
President Taft vetoed its statehood. The offending provision was removed,
statehood was achieved, and the state constitution was then amended to

Ernst Freund (the founding spirit of the University of Chicago Law School), and Learned

Hand. See CARRINGTON, supra note 14. (1999).
67
A recent compilation is CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert
P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flantz eds., 1990). For a compilation of current provisions
bearing on the selection of judges in the fifty states, see 33 COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 127-28 (2001).

68
The ease with which errant "counter-majoritarian" decisions can be overruled by
the legislature is an additional dimension of the problem; the amendment process can be a
means of accountability for high courts that abuse their authority. RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REv.
1561 (1998). Thus, as an alternative to electing judges, Francis Lieber urged frequent
amendment of the federal Constitution. FRANCIS LIEBER, AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATE SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICAN

PEOPLE (1865).
69
But cf. Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the
Rule of Law, 62 U. C. L. REv. 689 (1995) (arguing that democratic accountability is an

unconstitutional threat to individual rights).
70

See, e.g., Walter F. Dodd, The Recall and The PoliticalResponsibility of Judges,

10 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1911).
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restore what had been removed to secure the President's assent.7 1
President Theodore Roosevelt favored the reversal of unwelcome judicial
decisions by popular referendum. 72 It was at the time that these provisions
were being added to other state constitutions that the people of Ohio
amended their constitution to require the vote of a supermajority of
Justices to invalidate democratically enacted legislation. 7 3 Although there
are thus numerous variations, the important fact is that highest court judges
are in some form directly accountable to the people in thirty-nine states,
and in the others they serve limited terms, have mandatory retirement ages,
or are removable by address of the legislature.
Although Grimk6 was aware of problems with judicial elections,
especially the difficulty of supplying the necessary information to voters,
additional problems emerged with experience in the nineteenth century. In
some states, political parties gained control of the judiciary, a situation
remedied in some states by making judicial elections non-partisan. Some
judicial candidates sought office by committing themselves in advance of
hearing arguments by parties to disputes on issues likely to be brought
before their courts. Laws and rules were enacted to discourage this
practice, 7 4 with the adverse effect of further diminishing the interest of the
public in the question it was called upon to decide.
71
The details of Arizona's experience with judicial recall are provided by J. Patrick
White, Progressivism and The Judiciary: A Study of the Movement for Judicial Reform,
1901-1917, at 150-51 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
72
Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at Carnegie Hall, New York (Oct. 20, 1911), in 18
WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 244, 274 (Herman Hagedom ed., 1920). An account of
this remarkable event is provided by Edward Hartnett, Why Is The Supreme Court of the
United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEx. L. REV. 907,
933-49 (1997).
73
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2.
74
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted all or significant parts
of some version of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides a "gag rule" for judicial candidates. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 3-4, nn. 19 & 20 (3d ed. 2000). The 1972 version provides in relevant
part that a candidate for judicial office "should not make pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce
his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications,
present position or other fact." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(I)(c) (1972).
The 1990 version states in relevant part that:
A candidate for judicial office . . . shall not (i) make pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office; (ii) make statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court; or (iii)
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Many public-spirited people and institutions, including the American
Bar Association, the American Judicature Society, the League of Women
Voters, and most state bar organizations, responded to the problems of
judicial elections by expressing preference for "merit selection" of
judges. 75 That idea was popular in numerous states in the twentieth
century, but in its application to courts of last resort it is linked to a vision
of judicial office that is technocratic and apolitical. Although there was a
time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when many
American lawyers and some citizens deluded themselves with the belief
that judges could be trained to be professional technicians interpreting
statutes and constitutions without regard to their political consequences, 76
there is virtually no one who thinks that today.
As applied to highest state courts making decisions laden with political
consequences, merit selection is therefore an increasingly difficult idea to
sell, especially in an era in which the Supreme Court of the United States
has undertaken so visibly to exercise such enormous political power and
discretion with inconsistent regard for legal texts. The citizenry is quick to
see that political power would be transferred from themselves to those who
do the merit selecting. Despite the considerable advantages of merit
selection for selecting professional technicians who sit on lower courts, its
knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or
other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990). Cf Republican Party v. Kelly,

247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding the constitutionality of Canon 5 of Minnesota's
Code of Judicial Conduct, which was modeled on the 1990 version of the ABA Model
Code). For a discussion of the constitutionality of restrictions on candidates' speech in
judicial elections, see generally Adam R. Long, Note, Keeping Mud off the Bench: The First
Amendment and Regulation of False or Misleading Statements by Candidates in Judicial
Elections, 51 DutKE L.J. 787 (2001).

75

On the history and ideology of merit selection, see Kermit L Hall, Progressive

Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State
Supreme Court Judges. 1850-1920, 1984 ABF RES. J. 345; Glenn R. Winters, Selection of
Judges-An Historical Introduction, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1081 (1966).

76 Christopher Columbus Langdell, the founder of the case method and modem legal
instruction at Harvard Law School, is perhaps the most famous proponent of the view of
law as a technocratic pursuit. According to Langdell, the courts use certain fundamental
principles and the common law to find the "correct" answer to legal questions. For
Langdell, policy and politics play no part in jurisprudence. While Langdell's case method
approach to legal instruction grew in popularity, his "scientific" view of the law failed to
garner widespread acceptance. The Realists, who arose in part as a reaction against the
Langdellian view of law as a science, believed that judges decide first how they wish to
rule, and then use legal texts to justify their decision. For Realists, policy and politics is
jurisprudence. Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 J. L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 691 (1995).
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time as a politically viable alternative to judicial elections has passed. As
recently as 1987, Ohio voters rejected merit selection of judges by a two to
one margin. 77 The demand for judicial accountability remains a powerful
force in Ohio politics, and in light of the increased preoccupation of voters
with the political consequences of diverse judicial decisions and the
drumbeat of costly advertising calling attention to its role, it seems unlikely
that the vote would be as close if the issue were raised in 2001. There is
even talk today of dismantling merit selection for the Supreme Court of
Alaska. 78 The issues presented by merit selection are again actively
studied by the American Judicature Society and the American Bar
Association, the League of Women Voters, and the Conference of Chief
Justices. While law reform is in the air, and merit selection is again being
considered in Pennsylvania, 79 the prospects for public approval of a system
of selecting judges conferring primary responsibility on a committee of
lawyers seem dim.
Grimk6's reasons for electing judges abide. The concern that
haughtiness of excessively independent judges begets political instability
may be more pertinent today than we would like to believe. Class
divisions are becoming more marked in the United States than they have
been in the past. Judges who reside in guarded subdivisions, attend
sporting events in skyboxes, and send their children to private schools are
E.g., T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at IA. A number of prominent Ohioans, including
Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court, continue to advocate merit
selection of judges, despite its political unpopularity. Id. The Ohio Bar Association also
supports a state constitutional amendment to replace the current judicial election system
with a merit system. Croley, supra note 69, at 787. Other groups, like the Ohio
Roundtable, a nonprofit, nonpartisan education and research organization, oppose a merit
selection system for Ohio Supreme Court justices. Ohio Roundtable Opposes Ending
Judicial Elections, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 2000, at 4B. For a complete discussion
of the past and future of merit selection in Ohio, see John D. Felice, John C. Kilwein &
77

Elliot E. Slotnick, Judicial Reform in Ohio, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 51-71

(Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
78
William T. Cotton, Legislative Confirmation of Judges?, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 28, 1998, at B8. There is now, however, renewed talk of merit selection in
Pennsylvania.
79
See George Strawley, Ridge, Advocates Talk of Electing Pennsylvania Judges,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 11, 2001, at 3 (describing former Governor Tom Ridge's
"repeated call to put the question of 'merit selection' of judges onto the ballot statewide in
two years" in Pennsylvania); see also John M.R. Bull, Ridge's Last Words to Legislators:
'Play Nice', PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 2001, at Al (reporting that, in his farewell

address to a joint session of the state legislature, former Governor Ridge called on the
legislature to "[plass a judicial merit selection bill").
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unlikely to be in touch with the people they serve. Growing divisions of
class in America are reflected not merely in the architecture of our athletic
stadiums, but in numerous political issues. The current political movement
for education vouchers represents one manifestation of the impulse of the
privileged class to separate itself from common folk. Another is the
movement to allow the investing class to substitute investment accounts for
the social security system on which ordinary retirees must depend for old
age insurance. Most clearly motivated by the aim of consolidating a
privileged class are the repeal of the gift and estate tax and the rule against
perpetuities. We do not enumerate these phenomena to argue their merits,
but to confirm that social trends in America today would cause alarm
among Barnburners like Grimk6 and to explain why Ohio voters may be
increasingly reluctant to be governed by Justices who have no
accountability to them, but only to a profession that sees itself as part of a
hegemonic elite.
Courts, even more than schools and attendance at athletic contests, are
institutions in American society that must be shared by a diverse public
whose trust must be earned and maintained. Maybe a ruling class can
perpetuate itself in the United States by withdrawing its children from the
public schools and endowing them with wealth to assure them elite
educations, seats in the skyboxes, and a long, leisurely retirement. But if
the members of such an elite are expecting to do those things, then it is all
the more important to them, as Grimk6 saw, that the legal system be one
commanding the trust of those common citizens not sharing those
privileges. Prudent aristocrats who care about their descendants must see
the connection.
Until recent times, judicial campaigns were traditionally dull and
uninformative. Despite these inherent difficulties, Ohio and numerous
other states have lived with the election of judges for one hundred and fifty
years and could go on living peacefully with judicial elections but for
several developments of the last third of a century.
III. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS WITH JuDICIAL ELECTIONS:
THE OHIO EXPERIENCE

A chief justice of another state not long ago declared that there is no
method of selecting and retaining judges that is worth a damn.8 0 He was
not the first to express that wisdom.8 1 However, although there may be no
good method of selecting and retaining judges, there is a worst method,
and Ohio is among the states to have found it. That worst method is one in
which judges qualify for their jobs by raising very large sums of money
80

(1998).
81

ROSCOE POUND FOUND., PRESERVING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 15

For an elaboration, see Roger Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges?, 53 VA.
L. REV. 1266 (1967).
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from lawyers, litigants, and special interest groups, and retain their offices
only by continuing to raise such funds.
The initial source of the present difficulty was a secondary effect of the
civil rights movement resulting in the high visibility of the Supreme Court
of the United States during the Warren years.8 2 Following the Warren
Court, highest state courts across the country elevated the frequency with
which they made dramatic, high visibility decisions on issues of great
concern to citizens. The Supreme Courts of California and New Jersey led
the way, but Ohio was not far behind, and there was perhaps no state in
which that influence was not felt.8 3 Only professional lawyers with a
trained incapacity to see failed to notice that courts such as the Supreme
Court of Ohio were making "impact decisions," for even the refusal to
have impact was itself seen by more observant persons as a political
choice. The Warren Court and its contemporaries at the state level
inadvertently proved beyond debate the validity of Legal Realism.
This secondary effect of the Warren Court led to a tertiary response. If
highest state courts visibly exercise so much power, then those hoping for
impact or feeling or fearing its adverse effects were motivated to take a
greater interest in the selection of the members of such courts. The
breakout event occurred in California in the 1970s when voters reacted
strongly against a series of decisions of their state supreme court. The
Chief Justice barely survived a retention election in 1978,84 and she and
two of her colleagues were removed from the court by the voters in 1986 in
response to her refusal to participate in the enforcement of the death
penalty after the voters had amended the state constitution to overrule her
earlier decision that executions are unconstitutional.85 Meanwhile, some
trial lawyers, realizing that they had an enormous stake in the law of torts
being made by highest courts, began to groom and support candidates.
This event, of course, led to a further reaction by insurers and others
having contrary interests. Thus, the medical profession in Texas has come
to take a serious interest in judicial politics for the purpose of influencing

82

On the lionization of the Warren Court, see L. A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT

AND AMERICAN

PoLITIcS (2000):

LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL

LIBERAUSM 42-59 (1996).
83

See generally G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME

COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988).

For a recount of Texas's experience with high

profile state supreme court decisions, see Paul D. Carrington, Big Money in Texas Judicial
Elections: The Sickness and Its Remedies, 53 SMU L. REV. 263 (2000).
84
PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 43-44, 84-87 (198 1).
85
For a brief account of Rose Bird and the California Supreme Court, see
CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 81-87.
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the development of malpractice law. What we have established in high
86
court elections is interest group politics in its most unwelcome forms.
Stephen Ware's recent study confirms that such monetary investments
by interest groups can yield a nice return.8 7 In Alabama, he tells us,
campaign contributions have been effective to produce lock-step discipline
on the part of almost every judge to sit on the Supreme Court of that state
when she has been confronted with issues bearing on the hot-button issue
(in Alabama) of arbitrability of disputes. In recent years, justices
supported by trial lawyers vote against arbitration, and those supported by
business interests vote for it, virtually without regard for the facts or the
law. 88 Observations like Ware's must stimulate other interest groups to
seek representation in highest state courts.
Intensifying this advent of interest group politics in judicial elections
was the discovery in the 1960s of the power of television advertising. That
medium is extraordinarily effective, especially in lower visibility
campaigns such as those for seats on highest state courts. It is especially
useful for the communication of degrading observations about adversaries.
Television advertising is also extraordinarily expensive. To make such
advertising work, one needs to hire experts in the art form who can deploy
the right images and the right musical background. So equipped, a
candidate or anyone else can plant thoughts in the minds of an involuntary
audience not on guard against the ploys of deception. It is a confirmed fact
that such advertising, if well done, "melts down" in our minds; 89 that is to
86

For more tales from the world of campaign finance in judicial elections, see, e.g.,

Kurt M. Brauer, The Role of Campaign Fundraising in Michigan's Supreme Court
Elections: Should We Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 367

(1998) (discussing Michigan's experience with campaign finance in judicial elections);
Carrington, supra note 83 (discussing Texas's experience with campaign finance in judicial
elections); Nathan S. Heffernan, Judicial Responsibility, Judicial Independence and the
Election of Judges, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1031 (1997) (discussing Wisconsin's experience with

campaign finance injudicial elections); Glenn C. Noe, Alabama Judicial Election Reform:
A Skunk in Tort Hell, 28 CuMB. L. REv. 215 (1998) (discussing Alabama's experience with
campaign finance in judicial elections); see also David Barnhizer, "On the Make":
Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.

361,364 (2001) ("One consequence of the rising cost of judicial elections and the amassing
of large pools of campaign funds by special interests is that many judicial candidates are
consciously and unconsciously selling their votes on issues.").
87

Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J. LAw & POL 645 (2001).
8
One of the sixteen Justices in Ware's sample did occasionally stray. See id. And

after publication of his paper, the court strayed. See Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory
Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 16.
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KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DiRTY POLmCS: DECEPTION,

DEMOCRACY 123-35 (1992).
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say that we forget where we learned that a particular judicial candidate is a
skunk. We only remember that she is.
The expensiveness of media campaigns has the dramatic effect of
forcing not only judicial candidates but sitting judges hoping for reelection to seek and accumulate large campaign war chests. Often, lawyers
or litigants who are likely to appear before the judge constitute large
proportions of the contributions to judicial candidates. A report released
on June 29, 2000 by the Ohio Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse revealed
that incumbent Justice Alice Robie Resnick received $329,175 or eightyfour percent of her total campaign contributions at that point of the
campaign from Ohio trial lawyers. 90 The other three candidates in the race
for Resnick's Supreme Court seat combined received only $55,000 from
Ohio trial lawyers. 9 1 Despite the public criticism generated by her
campaign contributions from trial lawyers, Justice Resnick's 2000 reelection bid garnered more publicity because she was reportedly outspent
by her critics by at least seven to one, thanks in large part to the increased
2
use of unregulated "soft money" by third party "issue advocates."9
For her 1996 Ohio Supreme Court re-election bid, Justice Evelyn
Stratton received "$74,885 from finance, insurance and real estate firms;
$134,900 from lawyers and lobbyists, most of whom represent big business
before the court; and $16,476 from medical interests. '93 The law firm that
handled Justice Stratton's campaign later represented the tobacco industry
in a case before the Ohio Supreme Court.94 When asked about the
motivations of her campaign contributors, Justice Stratton asserted that
"her donors aren't seeking specific rulings but simply 'want a level playing
field."' 95 Justice Stratton's statement is one often heard in other states, but
it raises the obvious question of why contributors would view a donation as
necessary to ensure "a level playing field."
At best, campaign fundraising by judicial candidates is unseemly and
degrading. At worst, it tempts those with an interest in a state's law to try
to buy a high court. The sin committed should not be viewed as bribery in
the conventional criminal sense of that word because no judge who wins an
expensive election is required by his or her benefactors to surrender all
90

PersonalInjury Lawyers Bankroll Resnick's Re-election, PR NEwswIRE, June 29,

2000.
91

Id
See David Ruppe, Soft Money's Spread: Business Buys a Voice During Ohio
Supreme Court Race, ABCNews.com, at http://abcnews.go.comsections/politics/
DailyNews/ohiosoftmoney_001103.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2000) (on file with the
authors).
93
T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at IA.
92

94

The Buying ofthe Bench, NATION, Jan. 26, 1998.

95

Id.
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professional judgment and responsibility or to decide a particular case in
favor of his or her supporters. Instead, big money picks as candidates
individuals who have clear and strong predispositions favoring its interests.
The benefit acquired by the interest group prevailing in a judicial election
is not a specific outcome, but control over the court as an institution and
influence on the law that it makes. Professor Ware's data from Alabama
notwithstanding, 96 the effect of that control may never be seen in actual
decisions of cases, but only in the settlement value of claims and defenses
for which the members of the highest court are known to have particular
political predispositions. That effect can often provide a generous return
on the investment. We can be sure that those who funded pro-business
campaigns in Alabama have received a very good return on their money in
the form of reduced amounts needed to settle claims against them.
Those responding to this temptation to influence the law of Ohio in
this way are responsible for the perpendicular increase in the cost of
statewide judicial campaigns in many states. Before the 2000 election, one
observer estimated that the campaign for one Ohio Supreme Court seat
would generate at much as $12 million in fundraising. 97 Twenty years ago,
98
a campaign for an Ohio Supreme Court seat cost $100,000.
In addition to the large amounts a candidate must collect to run for
judicial office, numerous states, including Ohio, are now witnessing an
arms race between competing special interest groups. Although soft
money first became a major issue in Ohio judicial elections in 1996, the
2000 Supreme Court race marked the first time third party groups escaping
registration as political action committees [PACs] contributed large
amounts. 99 Critics of Justice Resnick, including the United States
Chamber of Commerce, various insurance groups, and an organization
called Citizens for a Strong Ohio, all ran "unregulated 'issue' ads
criticizing Resnick's record."' 00 Business and insurance organizations
worked to defeat the incumbent Justice Resnick, "in part, for writing the 43 majority opinion invalidating a law that would limit corporate liability in
civil lawsuits filed by injured Ohioans."'' 1 Anti-Resnick advertisements
first surfaced a year before the election "when a national lobbying group
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
Wood R. Foster, Jr., Latest Decision on Miranda is a Strong Case in Point for
Judicial Independence,STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), July 15, 2000, at 21 A.
98
William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State Courts, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 5, 2000, at Al.
99
Ruppe, supra note 92.
96
97

100
101

Id.
T.C. Brown, Resnick Overcomes Attacks, Wins High Court Race, PLAiN DEALER

(Cleveland), Nov. 8, 2000, at IA. For the decision which initiated the Ohio business
community's opposition to Justice Resnick, see State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1090-96 (Ohio 1999).
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for the insurance industry began 10a2 series of radio ads accusing her of
perpetuating outrageous lawsuits."
The advertisements promulgated by special interest groups in the
campaign for Justice Resnick's seat demonstrate the ferocity and
exaggeration that has become a hallmark of once tame state supreme court
elections. Citizens for a Strong Ohio, a pro-business organization closely
aligned with the Ohio Chamber of Commerce10 3 and not subject to
campaign finance regulation, accused Justice Resnick "of having an antibusiness bias, encouraged by the donations of trial lawyers."10 4 In one
television advertisement, Justice Resnick was depicted "in black robes
switching a vote after someone dumped bags of money on her desk.
Another show[ed] a blindfolded lady justice peeking at a pile of money on
her scales, before she and the scales fall over and break."' 0 5 Citizens for a
Strong Ohio successfully avoided disciplinary measures based on the
accuracy of its advertisements after the Ohio Election Commission, in a 43 decisions, determined that "Citizens did not have to file as a [political
action committee] and so [is not] subjected to state campaign finance and
truthful advertising laws." 1 6
In the 2000 elections, the United States Chamber of Commerce spent
for the first time in its history an undisclosed but substantial amount of

unregulated soft money in a number of state supreme court races and a
state attorney general race.10 7 Although the United States Chamber of
102

103

Brown, supra note 101, at IA.
Corrupting Influences Grow in Contests for Judgeships, USA TODAY, Nov. 2,

2000, at 16A; Ruppe, supra note 91.
to4 Brown, supra note 101, at IA.
Id.
105
106 Id. In addition, "issue" advocates like Citizens for a Strong Ohio do not fall
within the bounds of the Ohio Canons of Judicial Ethics, which regulate only the campaign
behavior of actual candidates.
107
Ruppe, supra note 92. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's unprecedented foray
into Ohio's judicial elections was no doubt instigated by recent state court decisions
invalidating "tort reform" laws. See, e.g., Crowe v. Owens Coming Fiberglas, 718 N.E.2d
923 (Ohio 1999) (per curiam) (holding that a punitive damages cap is unconstitutional);
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999)
(invaliding an omnibus tort reform statute that, inter alia, included caps on non-economic
damages and punitive damages and an abrogation of the collateral source rule on separation
of powers and single-subject rule grounds); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio
1994) (holding that the deduction of collateral benefits from jury awards violated the right
to trial by jury, due process, and equal protection and the right to a remedy); Zoppo v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994), cert. denied sub. nom., Damian v.
Galayda, 516. U.S. 810 (1995) (finding that a law requiring that future damages in medical
malpractice cases be paid periodically rather than as a lump sum violated the right to a jury
trial and due process); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (finding that a
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$200,000 cap on general damages in medical malpractice cases violated due process rights);
Pryor v. Webber, 263 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 1970) (holding that evidence of compensation from
collateral sources to diminish damages is prejudicial and inadmissible); Gladon v. Greater
Cleveland Reg. Transit Auth., No. 64029, 1994 WL 78468 (Ohio App. Mar. 10, 1994),
rev'd on other grounds, 662 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1996) (holding that a $250,000 non-

economic damage cap violated the right to ajury trial and equal protection).
Of course, the Ohio courts are not alone in their invalidation of tort reform legislation.
See, e.g., Am. Legion Post No. 57 v. Leakey, 681 So. 2d 1887 (Ala. 1996) (holding that a

statute admitting evidence of collateral source payments in personal injury cases violated
the plaintiff's right to a jury trial, equal protection, and due process), overruled by Marsh v.

Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000); Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1220 (1996) (finding that a $1million cap in wrongful death
cases against health care providers violated both equal protection and the right to a jury
trial), abrogated in Er pane Apicella, No. 1992273, 2001 WL 306906 (Ala. Mar. 30,
2001); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assocs., 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (holding that a

$400,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases violated both jury trial
and equal protection guarantees); Clark & Halliburton Indus. Servs. Div. v. Container Corp.
of Am., 589 So. 2d 184 (Ala. 1991) (holding that a statute permitting periodic payments of
personal injury damage awards greater than $150,000 violated the right to a jury trial);
Armstrong v. Roger's Outdoor Sports, Inc., 581 So. 2d 414 (Ala. 1991) (finding that a
statute ordering courts to make no presumptions about the correctness of punitive damage
awards violated separation of powers principles); Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, 730 P.2d
186 (Ariz. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987) (holding that a retraction in lieu of
damages in defamation actions violated the state's open courts provision); Kirk v. Denver
Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (finding that a statute designating one-third of
punitive damages as due to the state's general fund violated the takings clause of the state
and federal constitutions); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam)
(holding that a $450,000 cap on non-economic damages recoverable in actions for personal
injury violated the state's open court provision); Denton v. Con-Way S. Express, Inc., 402
S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1991) (finding that a statute admitting collateral source payments violated
the right to a remedy), overruled by, Grissom v. Gleason, 418 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 1992); Jones
v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (holding that a
medical malpractice damages cap was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Best
v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (I1. 1997) (finding that a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages was a legislative remittitur, which violated the separation of powers
doctrine and constituted impermissible special legislation); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp.
Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (111.1976) (finding that a $500,000 cap on damages in personal
injury action was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Thompson v. KFB Ins.
Co., 850 P.2d 773 (Kan. 1993) (holding that allowing the jury to consider collateral source
benefits when prayer for relief is in excess of $150,000 violated equal protection); Kan.
Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988) (holding that medical
malpractice caps violated jury trial and due process rights and constituted a legislative
remittitur), overruled in pan by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991); Farley v.
Engleken, 740 P.2d 1058 (Kan. 1987) (finding that the repeal of the collateral source rule
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violated equal protection guarantees); Wentling v. Med. Anesthesia Servs., P.A., 701 P.2d
939 (Kan. 1985) (same); Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998) (holding that
changes to standards governing the availability of punitive damages violated the right to a
jury trial, the right to remedy, the prohibition on damage caps, and wrongful death rights
guarantee); O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995) (finding that a statute
admitting evidence of collateral source payments in personal injury cases violated
separation of powers and established judicial powers to set rules of practice); Waldon v.
Housing Auth. 854 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that immunity from damages
when the injury results from intervening criminal act violated the right to a remedy);
Chamberlain v. State, 624 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993) (holding that a $500,000 ceiling on general
damages recoverable in a personal injury suit against the state violated the right to remedy
where sovereign immunity has been waived), superceded by LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(c);
Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212 (N.H. 1999) (holding that a $50,000 cap on wrongful
death claims where no dependent relative survives violated the right to a remedy and equal
protection guarantees); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (finding that an
$875,000 limit on noneconomic damages recoverable in actions for personal injury violated
equal protection guarantees); Carson v. Mauer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (finding that the
abrogation of the collateral source rule and a $250,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical
malpractice cases was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Richardson v.
Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763 P.2d 1153 (N.M. 1989) (holding that a damages cap in the
dram shop act was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds), overruled in pan by
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 305 (1998); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1979) (invalidating a statute imposing a $300,000 limit on damages recoverable in a
medical malpractice action and abrogating the collateral source rule on equal protection and
due process grounds); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988) (holding that a cap
based on the relative age of the claim invalid as special legislation); Lakin v. Senco Prods.,
Inc., 987 P.2d 476 (Or. 1999) (finding that a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in
personal injury and wrongful death actions violated the right to a trial by jury); Tenold v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 973 P.2d 413 (Or. App. 1994) (same); Viadock v. Nesbitt Mem'l Hosp.,
489 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding that a collateral source modification was not
severable from a medical malpractice arbitration statute, which was invalidated as a
violation of the right to trial by jury); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (holding
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds a statute admitting evidence of collateral
source payments in medical malpractice cases); Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183
(S.D. 1996) (finding that a statute limiting medical malpractice compensatory damages to
$1 million violated substantive due process); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1988) (holding that a statute limiting liability to $500,000 for damages in medical
malpractice cases violated the open courts guarantee); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775
P.2d 349 (Utah 1989) (finding that a statute limiting medical malpractice liability of state
hospitals to $100,000 violated the right to trial by jury); Sofie v. Fiberboard Corp., 771 P.2d
711 (Wash. 1989) (holding that a statute imposing a cap on non-economic damages for
personal injury at a rate of 0.43 times the average annual wage and life expectancy of the
plaintiff violated the jury trial guarantee); Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995)
(declining to impose a $1 million cap on non-economic damages retroactively); Discount
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Commerce's ads did not help Cuyahoga County appellate court Judge
Terrence O'Donnell prevail over Justice Resnick, the Chamber's
10 8
candidates prevailed in ten of the twelve supreme court races it targeted.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's use of advertisements attacking Justice
Resnick was denounced by every major newspaper in Ohio. 10 9 One report
estimated that the United States Chamber of Commerce and Citizens for a
Strong Ohio combined spent "$5 million or more" on advertisements
attacking Justice Resnick. 110 Another report stated that interest groups
spent more than $10 million total in the campaign for Justice Resnick's
seat. III
Of course, the United States Chamber of Commerce's purpose was not
to bribe judges in particular cases, but to assure "an even playing field,"
i.e., that the law of Ohio and other states is friendly to their corporate
members in their contests with consumers, employees, and environmental
groups, by defeating any judge whose assessment of the public interest
differs from that of the Chamber of Commerce. Its members will as a
result of this success more than recover the cost of the Chamber's
investment in savings effected by reducing their settlement offers in claims
brought against them. Of course, there are other interest groups making
similar investments for the same economic purpose.
There are persons endowed with a passionate commitment to the
glories of market economics who suppose that high bidders make efficient,
i.e. good, law. Bradley Smith seems to be such a theorist when he urges
that busy people with money to spend on judicial elections should not be
disfavored in their efforts to buy recognition and their competition with
candidates who are blessed with advantageous names. 112 Perhaps neither
or both of the candidates in such a contest would make good law, but if the
successful candidate has acquired the office by making a high bid, the
court is not, in Grimk6"s term, a "free institution" worthy of the enduring
respect of citizens.
The problem faced by Ohio in its contested judicial elections has been
encountered in some other states in a quite different form. Over half a
Fabric House v. Wis. Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417 (Wis. 1984) (holding invalid on public
policy grounds an exculpatory contract that limited liability for errors and omissions in paid
advertising).
108 Spencer Hunt, Chief Justice: Appoint Judges, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 10,
2000, at CO1.
109 Chamber's Ad Efforts Failed in Ohio, Worked in Other States, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Nov. 9, 2000, at 6.
110

Brown, supra note 101, at ]A.

III

Tony Mauro, Judges Shouldn't Have to Please Voters, USA TODAY, Oct. 18,

2000, at 17A.
112

Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns,

148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 599 (1999).
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century ago, the American Judicature Society began to promote the idea of
a judicial retention election as a means of providing a measure of
democratic accountability to make merit-selection more palatable to
voters. 113 A retention election is one in which a sitting judge runs for an
additional term without an opponent. It was thought that this protected the
judiciary from the deficiencies of free-swinging elections on the one hand
and life tenure on the other. But the same conditions that have resulted in
the tainting of competitive elections in Ohio have affected retention
elections as well. Sitting justices on high courts can become sitting ducks
for political adversaries willing to spend big bucks to drive them off the
bench. 114 Even if a given campaign of this sort is unsuccessful, it may
have an effect on the market value of claims and defenses adjudicated by
courts mindful of the willingness of special interest to spend vast sums to
terminate their judicial careers.
So widely shared is the despair that a meeting of Chief Justices was
held soon after the 2000 elections under the auspices of the National
Center for State Courts. William Glaberson of the New York Times
described the summit as "a response to growing concerns about the
million-dollar war chests, attack advertising and even outright distortion of
an opponent's record that seem to have become more widespread '1 in
15
judicial races this year and threaten public confidence in the courts."
The issue under consideration remained: given the technological and
political developments and the current state of First Amendment
jurisprudence, how if it all can our high courts be maintained as "free
institutions?" The expressed concerns of the judges led the American Bar
Association to create its commission to consider the problem.
IV. REPAIRING JuDICAL ELECTIONS
As the Chief Justices and the members of the ABA commission
perceived, the system is broken and not easily repaired.
Major
impediments to repair the rules of campaign finance have been constructed
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Three recently minted
principles of constitutional law, none of them ever imagined by Grimki,
must be addressed by those seeking a suitable method of selecting and
retaining justices. 116 Most troublesome is the holding in Buckley v.

113
114
115

Winter, supra note 75.
A few examples are briefly described in CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 110-1I1.
William Glaberson, Chief Justices to Meet on Abuses in Judicial Races, N.Y.

TIMEs, Sept. 8, 2000, at A14.
116 On the extravagant development of First Amendment law in recent decades, see
Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 1167 (2001).
Cf., e.g., Long, supra note 74 (examining the constitutionality of prohibitions on false or
misleading statements by judicial candidates).
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Valeo1 17 that campaign spending caps violate candidates' First
Amendment free speech protections."18 The Court in Buckley treated
election expenditures as political speech, giving such expenditures the
highest level of First Amendment protection possible. 1 19 The second is the
extension of the holding in New York Times v. Sullivan,' 20 stripping
candidates for judicial office from the protections long afforded by the law
of defamation. The third is the extension of the holding in NAACP v.
Alabama,1 21 affording a right to anonymity in politics. 122 The practical
result of these three holdings demonstrates the severity of the situation: the
First Amendment seems to allow special interest groups to spend as much
as they want, to say virtually anything they wish about judicial candidates,
regardless of how misleading and unfair the statements may be, and to
continue to maintain the anonymity of their members during the
advertising onslaught.
These statements of the Court's principles are oversimplified, but it is
not our purpose here to analyze or criticize them. We mean only to relate
them to the problem of judicial elections. The combined effect of the
Court's rulings tends to entrench the right of privileged interest groups
anonymously to buy quantities of television time for the purpose of
disparaging a candidate for judicial office with costly but effective spot
ads. It is remarkably easy to disparage any judge who has decided more
than a few cases because many decisions can be mischaracterized in spot
advertising and presented as the work of a reckless wrongdoer indifferent
to the welfare of the community. For example, one ad run in Ohio during
the 2000 election depicted a candidate as the judge who ruled against a
factory worker dismembered by a defective machine. Of course, any judge
who has ever voted to reverse a conviction, for any reason, can be
presented as the champion of criminals.

117

424 U.S. I (1976).

For recent criticism of the decision, see Richard L. Hasen,
Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance and "The Thing That Wouldn't Leave," 17 CONST.
COMMENTARY 483 (2000). An early critique is provided in J. Skelly Wright, Money and the
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM.

L. REv. 609 (1982). For an extended defense of the proposition that campaign expenditures
are a protected form of speech, see BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH (2001); Joel M.
Gora, No Law ... Abridging, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL 843 (2001); Martin H. Redish,
Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Fniance Reform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.

LAW 783 (2001).
118 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 14 (1976).
119

Id.
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376 U.S. 254 (1964).
357 U.S. 449 (1963).
Id. at 462 (recognizing "the vital relationship between freedom to associate and

121
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privacy in one's association").
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If we are obliged to give full and uncompromising respect to those
three principles of judge-made First Amendment law allowing anonymous
defamation of judicial candidates by individuals or interest groups free to J
spend infinite sums, 123 then the management of respectable judicial
campaigns under the present regime is impossible. Our law will simply be
for sale to high bidders. We will, like it or not, have an Ohio judicial
oligarchy selected by those with the money to buy it.
The Ohio Supreme Court tried to save judicial elections in Ohio. It
had been thought that the Supreme Court of the United States might cut
some slack for rules governing judicial campaigns. 124 The Ohio plan,
which set spending and individual contribution limits only in judicial
campaigns, was struck down in 1998 in a regrettable but not altogether
surprising application of Supreme Court doctrine by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 125 The Attorneys General of eighteen other states and
the United States Justice Department all joined Ohio to ask the court to
reverse or qualify Buckley v. Valeo and allow the establishment of
mandatory spending limits for judicial elections, 126 but all efforts to save
the campaign expenditure limits were fruitless. The result probably did not
affect the outcome of Ohio elections because those who seek to gain
control of the Ohio courts have discerned the "'soft money" loophole to
which the Ohio court's rule did not apply. 127 Because of Buckley, none of
the limitations imposed by the Ohio court were applicable to money spent
independently by interest groups or individuals other than candidates.
Efforts have been made in other states to tighten the rules for
disclosure of funding sources, and for disqualification of judges who have
been too generously supported by lawyers and litigants appearing before

123

Cf Long, supra note 74 (arguing that prohibitions on false or misleading

statements by judicial candidates can be sufficiently narrow and well-defined to guarantee
their constitutionality).
121 See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the
FirstAmendment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1803 (1999).
125 See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1114
(1999). In Suster, the Sixth Circuit refused to overturn Buckley v.Valeo and found that
Ohio's newly imposed campaign expenditure limits for judicial candidates violated the First
Amendment. 149 F.3d at 528-34. The Sixth Circuit held that, after Buckley, all campaign
expenditure limits were subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of the office sought in election.
Id. at 529.
126 Bob Hohler, Ban on Election Limits Facing Challenges on Two Fronts, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1997, at Al 1.
127 James Bradshaw, Spending Limits Rejected, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 29,
2000, at IC.
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them. 128 The major inadequacies of such legislation are that it fails to
reach direct spending on judicial elections by political organizations and
other interest groups, and that its provisions are enforceable only by civil
and criminal sanctions imposed on violators by elected prosecutors. This
approach is more promising if it provides for mandatory recusal of judges
receiving illegal support. But it is not imaginable that all judges receiving
support from an interest group such as the Chamber of Commerce could be
disqualified from deciding any case involving any of its members or
contributors even if all their names are disclosed.
The plan under consideration in North Carolina 129 proposes a variation
on public funding of judicial election campaigns that might work. It is a
variation on plans for "voter-owned" elections that have been advanced in
a few states. Some funding for the North Carolina plan would come from
a fifty-dollar annual tariff on all the lawyers in the state, save those who
openly refuse to share the burden, plus a one dollar designation on the state
income tax form unless the taxpayer refuses. There would also be a
noticeable filing fee imposed on the candidates that would be paid from
contributions limited to a hundred dollars. A candidate unable to secure
enough small contributions to pay the fee would not appear on the ballot.
Some of the money thus raised would be invested in an elaborate
Voter's Guide resembling that now in use in the state of Washington. Not
only would candidates be encouraged to present their qualifications and to
make a personal statement in the guide, but the same opportunity would be
afforded to other individuals or pre-existing groups that wished to endorse
a candidate for judicial office and to give reasons for their endorsement,
with a reasonable right of an opposing candidate to reply to any adverse
statement made about him or her. A reasonable charge would also be
imposed on those making endorsements.
The judicial voters guide could be distributed in print form without
charge at every public library and courthouse in the state and by mail to
anyone asking for it, or perhaps even to all registered voters. 130 In
videotape form, it could be available without charge to any television
station willing to broadcast in its entirety all portions bearing on a
particular race at a reasonable time. It would also be available to any
organization willing to show it to a gathering of its members. In addition,
it would be available in electronic form to anyone having access to the
internet.

128 E.g., Texas Judicial Campaign Fairness Act of 1995, Acts 1995,. 74th Leg., ch.
763, § 1, amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 479 § 1, amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg.,

ch. 479 § 1 et seq. (codified as TEx. ELEC. CODE § 253.151-253.176 (Vernon 2001)).
129

See N.C. S. 1054 (Oct. 2, 2001) (introduced by Senator Gulley).

130 Some voter's guides are now so distributed. The question remains whether this
type of bulk distribution marks them as mere junk mail.
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Any candidate or supporter publishing in the official guide would be
required to consent to certain conditions in exchange for the public support
being received in the form of the guide. One condition would be a
rigorous requirement of publicity as to the source of the funds being used
to buy a place in the guide or for any other purpose bearing on the
campaign. Candidates would have to agree not to borrow money and to
limit to a modest sum the amount accepted from any source.
Organizations publishing endorsements in the guide would also have to
agree to limit their campaigning extrinsic to the guide. Because judicial
elections produce low voter turnout, any scheme that brings accurate,
comparative information to even a small number of voters could have a
substantial effect on the outcome of a judicial election.
Candidates and "issue advocates" would remain free to avoid these
commitments by eschewing the guide. Such candidates would then be
listed in the guide, but the only information supplied about them would be
that they had declined to accept the conditions of a "voter-owned" election.
This would leave the voter free to draw any appropriate inference.
Most of the money received from the lawyers would primarily be used
as "rescue money" to rebut efforts or organizations to use "soft money" to
influence the results of the campaign. One might hope that the availability
of such a fund would have a prophylactic effect. Maybe the United States
Chamber of Commerce or other like groups would be deterred from
spending money to denounce a candidate for judicial office if they foresaw
a substantial response from a neutral source.
In its present form, the North Carolina scheme will not deploy any
appropriated public funds. Wisconsin has provided public money for
31
judicial candidates and is considering providing more. 1
A not insoluble problem lies in the identity of a sufficiently neutral
group to administer the system. That organization essentially will be a
close cousin to the group that would nominate judges under a merit
selection system. Retired judges or citizens who have given long and
honorable years of public service in other roles are a group from whom we
would hope to find members. They would be authorized to conduct a
public relations campaign to explain their mission and role to the voters.
The current proposal in North Carolina is supported by the North
Carolina Bar, the American Association for Retired Persons, the League of
Women Voters, the Black Caucus, and several groups favoring election
law reforms. We are told that the proposal will be voted on in 2002.
There can be no guarantee that this scheme would achieve its intended
effects. If adopted in Ohio, it is quite possible that there is an interest
group that will be so intent on buying the Supreme Court of Ohio, and thus
gaining control over the law of Ohio, that it will invest bundles in fancy
131 William Glaberson, States Take Steps to Rein in Excesses of Judicial Politicking,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at 1.
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television advertising designed to alarm voters about a candidate otherwise
headed for election. The possibility remains that the people of Ohio will
be successfully deceived by such a group and vote in response to
misleading sound bites uttered by professional actors to the
accompaniment of Beethoven. If so, the scheme will have failed. This
scheme also undoubtedly will have unforeseen and unintended
consequences, as all reforms do.
A beauty of the North Carolina scheme is that it can be put in place by
a state legislature and requires no amendments of state constitutions. For
those willing to take on the challenge of amending a constitution, other
options are available.
An idea under discussion in Ohio newspapers is a proposal for a

substantial lengthening of terms of office. There is much to be said for that
idea. It has been urged by the study group of the Century Fund after its
consideration of the crisis. 132 It would mean that at any one time, many
members of the Ohio Supreme Court would see the re-election campaign
as no more than a distant threat. Hence, there would be more
independence of a sort. On the other hand, the stakes in each election
would rise. If the terms are made very long, then the system of
accountability advocated by Grimk6 is weakened or destroyed, and the
court would be increasingly free to impose its political will on the people
of Ohio.
Also worthy of consideration is the elimination of partisan primaries
and the introduction of preferential voting. The purpose would be to
abbreviate campaigns and thereby reduce their costs. This would serve to
magnify the effectiveness of the scheme presently under consideration in
North Carolina.
If merit selection is to be reconsidered, it will, we think, need some
rethinking. One possibility is to reconsider the identity of the merit
selectors. Possibly they might be elected for terms. It might also be useful
to consider the possibility that the nominations of judges, however made,
go directly to the voters for a confirmation election. The nominating group
might also be assigned the role of evaluating judicial performance and
making a recommendation with respect to retention. It might then be
equipped with funds to conduct a "rescue" on behalf of a judge they vote to
retain who is calumnied by an issue-advocacy group.
Whether the voters of Ohio could be sold any of these ideas we cannot
say. The reader will note, however, that all the suggestions we have
proposed are faithful to the purpose of judicial elections as explained by
Grimkd. Ohio judges would be given ample reason to know that they are
the servants of the people of Ohio, not their rulers. Perhaps they would not
be the most luminous candidates available to fill their offices, but they
would be more likely to understand and accept the limits to their authority
132

See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 1. at 90-91.
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and they would be protected from the efforts of powerful persons and
groups seeking to intimidate and control them.
In discussing these ideas with an audience in Columbus, the question
was asked whether judges selected by democratic means could be relied
upon to be sufficiently resistant to majoritarian demands. The only
response that can be made to that question is another question: to whom do
the people of Ohio want their judges beholden? To high-spending issues
advocates? Or perhaps like the federal judiciary only to their own sense of
self-restraint, if any? As noted earlier, there is no method of selecting
judges that is worth a damn.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we invoke the words of another important Ohioan of
Grimke's time, Timothy Walker of Cincinnati, the founder of the law
school in that city and a person whose politics were very different from
those of Grimke. In 1838, he told his students that:
We are trying the greatest political experiment the world
ever witnessed; and the experience of all history warns us
not to feel too secure. A voice from the tombs of all
departed republics tells us that if our liberty is to be
ultimately preserved, it is at the price of sleepless
vigilance. I refer not to foreign aggression, for this we
have nothing to fear; our only foes are those of our own
household. Domestic aggression may come from two
quarters. On the one hand, power [and wealth are] always
tending to augmentation. Those who have some, employ it
to gain more; and if not seasonably withstood, become too
strong to be resisted. And on the other hand, liberty is
always tending to licentiousness. The more men have, the
more they are likely to want. Being free from many
restraints, they would do away with all. Now when
dangers threaten, from either of these quarters; when [the
powerful] would trample the law under their feet, or mobs
would rise to overthrow it; who are the sentinels to give
the alarm? Do I assume too much in saying [those] whose
13 3
profession it is to watch over the law?
Walker and Grimke, despite differences in their partisanships, were
united in the view that judges must be independent from the control of both
the privileged few and the licentious many. They also reckoned together
on the need for a measure of accountability to assure that those exercising
lawmaking power remain in control of their partisan and self-indulgent
impulses, attentive to their competing obligations, and faithful to the law.
133
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The judicial system they devised would today be to them a cause for alarm
calling for prompt remediation. Perhaps there are better solutions for Ohio
than the ones we propose, but inaction is not one.

